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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Defendant/Respondent, CCI Mechanical Service, hereafter referred to as "CCI," agrees with 
the Statement of Issues and the Standards of Review set forth in the Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, Alta 
Health Strategies. Inc., hereinafter referred to as "Alta Health." 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Alta Health's Complaint in this matter alleges claims of negligent misrepresentation, breach 
of warranty and breach of contract as against CCI. The claims arise out of the alleged damage to 
certain computer equipment at the Alta Health facility on December 25, 1991. The matter was tried 
to a jury before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, commencing August 9, 1995. At the conclusion of 
the evidence presented by Alta Health, Judge Lewis granted a Motion for Directed Verdict against 
Alta Health and in favor of CCI. R. 251-257. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
In order to recover for the alleged destruction or damage to the computer equipment, Alta 
Health was required to produce evidence that would allow the jury to determine the amount of 
damages with reasonable certainty. To do so, Alta Health was required to provide evidence of the 
actual cost of replacement it incurred for the new equipment, the market value of the damaged 
computer equipment immediately before the loss and the amount of any salvage value associated 
with the damaged equipment. Alta Health failed to produce any evidence whatsoever as to the 
market value of the damaged equipment or its salvage value. The evidence of replacement cost 
introduced by Alta Health was inconsistent and speculative. Alta Health failed to sustain its burden 
of proof regarding the applicable measure of damages. 
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POINT n 
Alta Health's claim for recovery against CCI on the theory of negligent misrepresentation 
was not supported by the evidence. Alta Health failed to establish that (1) CCI made a negligent 
misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) Alta Health reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation; 
and (3) CCI should have reasonably foreseen that Alta Health would rely upon such fact. 
POINT m 
Alta Health had the burden of proof to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the acts or omissions of CCI were the proximate cause of the alleged damages to the computer 
equipment. The evidence presented by Alta Health failed to establish whether the outside electrical 
power was "ofF"or "on" when Russell Loudon entered the computer room on December 25, 1991. 
There was no evidence submitted whatsoever as to what caused the air conditioning system to cease 
operating on December 25, 1991. The causal connection between the alleged wrongful act of CCI 
and Alta Health's alleged property damage cannot be presumed. It is a matter that Alta Health was 
required to prove affirmatively. It failed to do so. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. As of December 25, 1991, CCI Mechanical Service ["CCI"] was constructing and 
installing certain alterations on the air conditioning system and equipment at the Alta Health Strate-
gies, Inc. ["Alta Health"] computer facility pursuant to a written contract. R.445, Exh. 5. 
2. Part of the work being performed by CCI at Alta Health as of December 25, 1991, 
included the modification and alteration of an "automatic switching system" that would allow the 
air conditioning system to automatically restart when the main electrical power was restored 
following a main electrical power outage. David English, Russell Loudon and Kent Broadhead, Alta 
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Health employees, knew that the air conditioning contract work being performed by CCI was not 
complete on December 25, 1991. R. 408-416, 654-655. 
3. Although Russell Loudon testified that he "understood" from a conversation with a 
CCI employee that the automatic switching system was operational as of December 25, 1991, he 
knew that the new electrical control panel, with the air conditioning system indicator lights, was not 
installed. Prior to December 25, 1991, Russell Loudon did not inquire of any CCI employee 
regarding how the system would indicate that the automatic switching mechanism was working, or 
how the new system would work, or what the computer operators were to do regarding monitoring 
the new system. He knew there would be new indicator lights on the new electrical control panel 
when it was installed that would indicate which chillers in the air conditioning system were working. 
R. 411, 413-416. 
4. The automatic switching system was not operational as of December 25, 1991. R. 
432-433. 
5. Prior to December 25, 1991, and subsequent to December 25, 1991, Alta Health 
manned the computer room facility 24-hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. R. 427, 
444. 
6. The air conditioning system at the Alta Health Computer facility was not serviced 
by any auxiliary power supply. The sole power supply was from the main public utility service. 
The Alta Health computer system was supplied with electrical power by the main public utility 
service and with an auxiliary "uninterrupted power supply" ["UPS"] system, which provided 
electrical power in the event of a main power supply failure. As of December 25, 1991, Alta Health 
employees knew that the air conditioning system was not serviced by any alternative power source. 
As of December 25, 1991, Kent Broadhead and Russell Loudon, employees of Alta Health, knew 
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that in the event of a main electrical power outage, the computer system would be powered for 30-45 
minutes by an alternative power source from the UPS system. As of December 25, 1991, Kent 
Broadhead knew that in the event a main electrical power failure occurred and the UPS power 
system was consumed, the multi-million dollar Alta Health Computer System would sustain a 
catastrophic failure. R. 463-465, 549, 593-594, 629-632. Alta Health knew that CCI was not 
performing any work or alternations to the UPS system. R. 657. 
7. Kent Broadhead and Russell Loudon decided to leave the Alta Health computer 
facility unmanned on December 25, 1991, with employees periodically (hourly) checking on the 
system. R. 408. 
8. On December 25, 1991, between the hour of 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., an event 
occurred at the Alta Health computer facility causing the air conditioning system to stop. R. 407. 
Alta Health had no information as to what caused the air conditioning system to stop. R. 452. 
9. Russell Loudon, an employee of Alta Health, was the manager of the Computer 
Operations Center, charged with overseeing all computer operations for Alta Health. He entered the 
computer room sometime between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., on December 25, 1991, and discovered 
that the temperature in the computer room had reached 95° Fahrenheit. R. 367, 372, 407. 
10. Upon subsequent evaluation of the computer room equipment, Alta Health and 
Unisys, Inc., the computer equipment supplier and maintenance contractor, determined that five to 
seven head disk assemblies ["HDA's"] required replacement. R. 459. 
11. The HDA's requiring replacement were all associated with the Unisys Model 9494-24 
unit. R. 459. No failure analysis was performed to determine what caused the HDA's to fail. R. 
514. 
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12. The Model 9494-24 HDA's requiring replacement were not replaced by Alta Health 
and Unisys with the same model, but were replaced with new model 9730 Unisys units. R. 459. 
13. In the transaction for replacement of the Model 9494-24 units with the new Unisys 
Model 9730 units, Unisys granted unspecified price concessions for the conversion to the new 
Model 9730 units. R. 557-558. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED 
THAT ALTA HEALTH FAILED TO MEET ITS 
BURDEN OF PROVING ITS DAMAGES WITH 
REASONABLE CERTAINTY 
This action was commenced by Alta Health seeking recovery of damages allegedly sustained 
on December 25, 1991, to personal property, to-wit: certain computer equipment denominated as 
Model 9494-24 Head Disc Assemblies ("HDA's") located at Alta Health's facilities in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. At the conclusion of Alta Health's evidence at trial, the Honorable Judge Leslie A. 
Lewis ruled that Alta Health failed to meet the burden of proving its damages with reasonable 
certainty. 
The analysis of whether the trial court was correct must begin with a definition of the proper 
measure of damages and whether Alta Health offered evidence of facts necessary to prove the 
elements of such measure of damages. Unfortunately, just as occurred during trial, Alta Health has 
failed to provide this Court with any guidance regarding its theory [ies] of the appropriate measure 
of damages in this case. 
The fundamental rule regarding the measure of damages to personal property is set forth at 
22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, § 429, which provides that: 
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The ordinary and basic measure of damages for injury to personal 
property is the difference between its market value immediately 
before and after the injury, or, in the case of its destruction, its market 
value at the time of the loss. 
This rule regarding the measure of damages to personal property is followed by virtually 
every jurisdiction in the United States, including Utah. (See string cite Footnote 1 ed. § 429.) In 
Winters vs. Charles Anthony. Inc.. 586 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978), where the owner of jewelry brought 
an action against a jewelry store owner to recover the value of jewelry which was lost or stolen 
before the owner could reclaim it, the Utah Supreme Court followed the general rule and defined 
"market value," when it held that: 
The general rule is that damages awarded for personal property that 
is taken or destroyed is based upon the item's market value at the 
time of the taking or destruction. Ordinarily, market value is defined 
as the price for which the article is bought and sold and for which 
there exists a demand in the market place, and the legal definition of 
that price is retail, not wholesale . . . . Id at 454. 
The market value of Alta Health's Model 9494-24 HDA's allegedly destroyed is, therefore, 
to be determined at the time of the alleged destruction. 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, § 430. 
Where the personal property is alleged to have been destroyed, as is the claim in this case, 
an additional necessary element involves the "salvage value" associated with the damaged property. 
The net value of any possible salvage must be deducted from the value of the damaged property in 
determining damages." 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, § 431. This element to the measure of damages 
was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co.. 241 P.2d 914 (Utah 
1952), where the Court reiterated its "replacement cost rule" which applies to the destruction of 
personal property. In Park, a poultryman raising chickens for egg production brought an action 
against the feed manufacturer and its salesman for breach of warranty due to the death and loss of 
production of the chickens being fed under the defendant's "self-feeding system." 
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In analyzing the appropriate measure of damages, the Court held that: 
We are in accord with the general proposition that where property is 
destroyed, the true measure of damages is the difference between the 
market value of that property immediately before the destruction and 
its replacement cost . . . less any salvage value of the destroyed 
property. This replacement cost rule has been applied in many cases 
of injuries to personal . . . property by this Court. (String cite 
omitted.) Id. at 921. 
As Alta Health correctly admits in its Brief, it had the burden to produce a sufficient 
evidentiary basis to establish the fact of damages and permit the trier of fact to determine with 
reasonable certainty the amount of its damages. Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins. Brown & 
GunnelL Inc.. 784 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1989); Henderson v. For-Shor Co.. 757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 
1988); Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co.. 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986); Atkin. Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.. 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985); Acculog. Inc. v. Peterson. 
692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984). Consequently, in order to recover damages, Alta Health had the burden 
to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following elements: 
(1) The computer equipment allegedly damaged was destroyed. 
(2) The market value of the computer equipment (Model 9494-24 HDA's) 
immediately prior to its destruction. 
(3) Any salvage value with respect to the allegedly destroyed computer 
equipment. 
(4) The replacement cost actually incurred for the purchase of comparable 
replacement computer equipment. 
With respect to element number (1) above, Alta Health introduced evidence that Model 
9494-24 HDA's had to be replaced due to failure shortly after the event of December 25, 1991. 
Causation issues will be discussed in Point III below. For purposes only of discussing the damages 
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issue, it is assumed the equipment in question was damaged to a state beyond repair, requiring 
replacement. 
It is the second element where Alta Health's claim utterly fails. There is absolutely no 
testimony or documentary evidence that was introduced at the time of trial where Alta Health even 
attempted to establish a market value of the allegedly damaged 9494-24 HDA computer equipment 
immediately prior to its destruction. Even though Alta Health introduced the direct testimony 01 the 
Sales Manager for Unisys, who sold the 9494-24 HDA computer equipment in question to Alta 
Health, never did Alta Health so much as ask a question of this gentleman regarding the market 
value of the damaged equipment immediately before its alleged destruction. Neither did Alta Health 
introduce any evidence whatsoever with regard to the age of the computer equipment allegedly 
damaged, nor when the computer equipment was purchased or acquired by Alta Health, nor the 
original cost of such equipment, nor the date that the equipment had been placed in service. Indeed, 
none of Alta Health's witnesses could testify as to whether the computer equipment allegedly 
destroyed was three months old, six months old, two years old or three years old at the time of the 
alleged destruction. R.402, R.472, R.552, R.636. 
Further, Alta Health's own witnesses admitted that during the one to two year period prior 
to the date of destruction of the computer equipment alleged in this action, the 9494-24 HDA 
computer equipment located at the Alta Health facility had incurred abnormally high rates of failure. 
Indeed, the failure rates were 3.89 times higher than Alta Health or Unisys expected. R.505, R.552, 
Exh. 30. These failures were primarily due to overheating conditions and environmental 
contamination within the Alta Health facility. R.403, 404, 406, 463, 471, 486, 494, 499, 505, 552, 
638. Under these uncontroverted facts, it was particularly incumbent upon Alta Health to at least 
attempt to introduce evidence as to the market value of the equipment on the date of the alleged 
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destruction. Again, absolutely no evidence whatsoever was introduced or even attempted to be 
introduced by Alta Health relative to market value of the equipment as of December 25, 1991.! 
The next element of proof of damages, which Alta Health completely failed to address, was 
the issue of the amount of salvage value for the model 9494-24 HDA equipment allegedly destroyed. 
Alta Health's witness, the Sales Manager from Unisys Corporation who sold all of the computer 
equipment in question to Alta Health, specifically addressed the issue. This individual, Mr. Dale 
Brown, testified on cross-examination as follows: 
Q Now, when one of those HDA's has to be replaced and Unisys takes 
it out, do they just leave that HDA with Alta Health? Does that 
become the property of Alta Health? 
A No, that would go back into our rework or refurbishing plant, as I 
understand it, because there are many components that would still be 
good that, in fact, are valuable. 
(R. 554.) 
And, again, when asked about how the damaged HDA's are replaced, Mr. Brown testified: 
Q They're sent back. And I believe you just said they were sent back to be 
refurbished. 
A There are components that are still valuable, yes. 
(R.555.) 
Although Mr. Brown could not testify from his own personal knowledge as to whether the 
damaged HDA's in question in this litigation had been sent back for refurbishment, he knew they 
were not left with Alta Health. R.555. 
1
 Since Alta Health never addressed the issues of market value of the allegedly damaged equipment at trial, Alta 
Health cannot now attempt to raise any issue about whether a "market" exists with respect to used computer 
equipment. One need only look at the advertisements in the many computer trade journals, magazines and 
newspaper want-ads to find that it is common knowledge that used computer equipment has a "market." 
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However, Mr. Jim Bolinder, the Unisys Service Engineer who actually worked with the 
damaged 9494-24 HDA computer equipment in question on December 25, 1991, specifically 
testified that the damaged computer equipment in question here was taken out and sent back to 
Unisys for refurbishment, just as described in Mr. Brown's testimony. R. 636-637. 
Having heard this testimony of the Unisys witnesses, it was incumbent upon Alta Health to 
produce evidence of the amount of salvage value of the valuable components remaining in the 
Model 9494-24 HDA's that were returned to Unisys. This is particularly true where Alta Health 
acquired the newer model replacement computer equipment from Unisys. Alta Health failed to 
produce or elicit any evidence whatsoever regarding this issue. 
Thus, it is uncontroverted that the allegedly destroyed computer equipment was returned to 
Unisys and that equipment contained valuable components. There was indeed, salvage value 
associated with this equipment. Having failed to produce any evidence whatsoever as to the extent 
of salvage value, Alta Health failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to the amount of 
damages, if any, it actually sustained. 
The final element necessary to complete the formula under the replacement cost rule is the 
consideration of replacement cost incurred for new computer equipment. The facts established by 
Alta Health's witnesses concerning acquisition of new computer equipment again failed to provide 
a legally sufficient basis to allow a determination of damages with "reasonable certainty." 
The damaged Model 9494-24 HDA's were not replaced "with like units." Although Mr. 
Brown from Unisys was asked if it took seven new models to replace five old ones, he could only 
indicate that "some kind of calculation was done." R.542. No evidence was presented as to the 
exact number of new computers needed to replace the damaged old computers. 
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Due to the high failure rates that Alta Health had experienced with the Model 9494-24 
HDA's, Alta Health had decided by October 1991, two to three months before the incident in 
question, that all future drives acquired by Alta Health would be the new Unisys Model 9730. These 
were determined by Alta Health to be "about six times more reliable" than the previous models. 
Alta Health had budgeted to replace all old drives with these newer drive models. R.493, Exh. 38. 
By July 16, 1991, Alta Health had determined that the primary reason for the high failure rate 
experienced with the 9494-24 HDA's was due to a Unisys filter in the units. As of that time, Alta 
Health had already decided to move to the new Model 9730 computer system. R.506-507, Exh. 31. 
Alta Health issued Purchase Orders for seven of the Unisys Model 9730 units at a price of 
$19,300.00 per unit, or a total order amount of $134,900.00. R.539, Exhs. 7 and 8. However, in 
order to induce Alta Health into ordering the new generation of computer equipment, Unisys gave 
certain unspecified price considerations to Alta Health. R.557-558. 
Exhibits 7 and 8 were orders for such equipment, not billing invoices to Alta Health. No 
documentary evidence was ever offered or proffered by Alta Health showing the amount that Unisys 
actually billed to Alta Health for the "replacement" computer equipment, nor was any evidence ever 
offered showing the actual amount, if any, paid for this particular equipment or the extent and nature 
of the price considerations and inducements given Alta Health by Unisys for conversion to the new 
generation of computers. In fact, the only witness who specifically testified regarding the issue of 
whether Alta Health really incurred any "replacement cost" for the Model 9494-24 HDA's, was Mr. 
Russell Loudon, the Computer Room Manager for Alta Health. His testimony was: 
Q And Unisys replaced those at Alta Health Strategies' expense as I'm told, is 
that correct? 
A I don't know that to be true. I don't know that we had to pay for them. 
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Although Mr. Kent Broadhead testified that the cost to replace the five HDA's with the more 
advanced model was approximately $119,000.00 (R.460-461), he never testified that Alta Health 
actually incurred the cost. Additionally, his "approximate cost" is totally different than his own 
Purchase Order Exhibit No. 7 ($96,300.00), and Purchase Order Exhibit No. 8 ($38,600.00), 
supposedly involving the replacement of the HDA's in question. 
The evidence presented by Alta Health on this e of replacement cost is so self-
contradictory that the trial court properly concluded that Alta r
 w r.h had failed to prove what, if any, 
replacement cost was incurred by Alta Health. 
Obviously recognizing the weakness of its evidentiary record, Alta Health further argues 
that, at least, it demonstrated that it incurred costs for a service call by Unisys service engineers to 
work on its computer equipment on December 25 and 26, 1991, and should, therefore, recover 
"nominal damages."2 Alta Health relies upon Exhibits No. 2 and No. 3 o r 'he record. However, 
examination of both Exhibits No. 2 and No. 3 demonstrate yet another fab of Alta Health to 
demonstrate that it incurred any cost. 
Exhibit No. 2 is a Unisys Customer Service Order #A2565811, dated 12/25/91. It was 
prepared by Jim Bolinder, the Unisys Service Engineer. As stated at the top of the Exhibit, it is 
merely a Customer Service Order form. It is not an invoice. It is not signed by the customer (Alta 
Health). Likewise, Exhibit No. 3 is another Unisys Customer Service Order, number A2565812, 
dated December 29, 1991. Again, it is not an invoice. It is not signed by Alta Health. There was 
no evidence introduced by Alta Health that it ever received an invoice or billing for these services 
2Alta Health's argument for nominal damages is founded upon its claim for breach of contract and breach of 
warranty. However, no evidence was produced indicating any breach of the terms of the Contracts introduced into 
evidence. [Exh. 4 and 5.] To the contrary, Alta Health's own witness [David English] testified that the work by CCI 
was completed, accepted and paid. He specified no breach of the Contract by CCI. R. 660-662. 
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from Unisys. Nor was there any evidence introduced that Alta Health ever paid for any of these 
services. Again, only speculation has been introduced into evidence. 
Where are the invoices or billings? Where are the canceled checks demonstrating payment? 
At the very least, where are the accounts payable records of Alta Health showing any costs were 
ever really incurred, either for the replacement computers or for the service work of Unisys? 
In applying the evidence produced by Alta Health to the requirements of the replacement 
cost rule set forth in Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co.. supra, we get the following: 
1. Market value of the damaged 9494-24 HDA's immediately before 
destruction. 
Answer: Unknown 
2. Salvage value of the valuable components of the damaged 9494-24 HDA's. 
Answer: Unknown 
3. Replacement cost to Alta Health for purchase of comparable replacement 
computer equipment. 
Answer: Unknown 
In order to satisfy the requirement of proving its damages with reasonable certainty, Alta 
Health argues at great length in its Brief that it needed only to introduce evidence that (1) the 
computer equipment (Model 9494-24-HDA's) was destroyed, and (2) the cost of new, advanced 
equipment. However, by ignoring the clear requirements of Utah law regarding evidence as to the 
fundamental elements required for the measure of damages to personal property, the jury could not 
have done anything other than speculate as to what, if any, damages Alta Health supposedly 
sustained. Without evidence as to the market value of the 9494-24 HDA's at the date of loss and 
without evidence as to any salvage value, there was no rational basis presented by Alta Health to 
allow the jury to determine damages with reasonable certainty. 
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The reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court in Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co.. supra, provides 
the appropriate basis for analysis of Alta Health's burden of proof here. In Sawyers, the Plaintiff 
filed suit against a creditor seeking to recover lost profits to his business arising from a wrongful 
termination of a line of credit. The trial court found that FMA had wrongfully terminated the 
Plaintiffs line of credit but that Plaintiffs claimed damages for loss of future profits were too 
speculative and that the evidence was insufficient to enable the Court to determine the amount of 
damages. 
The Appellant in Sawyers urged that uncertainty as to the amount of damages is not fatal to 
his claim so long as he has successfully proved his cause. The Supreme Court held "that damages 
must be proven with reasonable certainty and the amount by a reasonable though not necessarily 
precise estimate." Id. at 774. Sawyers introduced only testimony as to its lost gross profits. The 
Court held that the proper measure of damages in such a case is lost net profits. 
Proof of lost gross profits does not afford courts a proper basis for a 
damage award, where there is no evidentiary basis on which to 
calculate net profits with reasonable certainty." Id- at 774. 
Further, the standard of reasonable certainty in proof of damages 
requires more than a mere estimate of net profits. The Court required 
"supporting evidence of overhead expenses, or other costs of 
producing income from which a net figure can be derived . . . 
Plaintiff... has the burden to produce sufficient evidentiary basis to 
. . . permit the trier of fact to determine with reasonable certainty the 
amount of lost net profits. The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs 
"failure to place before the Court financial summaries, monthly sales 
volume breakdowns, cost of sales expenses, or any other overhead 
expenses from which the trial court could reasonably have calculated 
Plaintiffs lost net profit, is fatal to his claim." Id. at 775. 
The burden upon Alta Health here should be no different than in Sawyers. Alta Health 
wishes to be paid for a new generation of computer equipment to replace old, unsatisfactory 
equipment. Alta Health placed before the trial court only a Purchase Order for the new generation 
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of equipment and nothing more. There were no estimates of market value of the old equipment, nor 
evidence of the salvage value of valuable components of the old equipment, nor invoices evidencing 
Alta Health ever having been billed for the equipment of the service. Only, speculation. 
To illustrate the fallacy of Alta Health's reasoning of proof of damages, consider what 
happens in an automobile accident. Under Alta Health's theory, if one's 1992 Chevrolet 4 x 4 
Blazer (two-door) is totaled in an accident, the owner can replace it with a new 1996 Chevrolet 4 
x 4 T^hoe (four-door) and recover the full price for the new vehicle. No evidence is necessary 
regarding the salvage value of the 1992 vehicle, even though the engine, four-wheel drive transfer 
case, mag wheels, etc., were undamaged. Nor is there any need to consider the market value of the 
1992 vehicle. Depreciation is not an issue. Alta Health's argument would allow recovery of the full 
purchase price of the new 1996 vehicle. And that amount could be established by a purchase order 
issued before price concessions are negotiated with the dealer. 
Such measure of damages propounded by the Aita Health simply is not the law in Utah or 
in any other jurisdiction. 
POINT n 
ALTA HEALTH FAILED TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION 
In order for the jury to have found in favor of the Alta Health on its claim of negligent 
misrepresentation, it had to produce specific evidence that: 
1. CCI made a negligent or careless misrepresentation of a material fact. 
2. Alta Health reasonably relied upon the misrepresentation. 
3. CCI should have reasonably foreseen that Alta Health would rely upon such 
fact. 
16 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp.. 423 P.2d 659 (Utah 1967); Forsberg v. Bumingham & KimbalL 892 
P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1995). 
Alta Health can point only to the testimony of its own employee, Mr. English, who testified 
that CCFs service employee told him right before Christmas that the work "was 95, or 99 percent 
done, they were waiting on an electronic part to come in that would do the switch over piece." 
R.654. CO's employee did not indicate to Mr. English when the electronic part would arrive. 
R.655. Contrary to Alta Health's assertions, this testimony clearly indicated that the specific work 
to complete the automatic switch over was not done. 
Alta Health's argument (Argument II) that it is undisputed that "the Defendant made a 
misrepresentation to Plaintiff [and] all of Plaintiffs employees testified that Defendant represented 
to Plaintiff that the automatic switch over was working on December 25," is a ridiculous 
misrepresentation of the evidence. Mr. Kent Broadhead certainly never had any conversation with 
CCI employees prior to December 25, 1991, regarding the automatic switch over. R. 461-462. 
Just as important is the fact that none of Alta Health's employees advised CCI of the decision 
to leave the computer center unattended on Christmas Day. R.462. Alta Health goes to great length 
in its Brief, pointing out that it was well known to CCI that the computer center was manned 24 
hours per day, 365 days a year. It had always been the practice of Alta Health to do so. Yet, Alta 
Health now claims that CCI is responsible when this policy was changed, while admitting it never 
told CCI that the change would occur. Clearly, there is no evidence whatsoever to establish that CCI 
should reasonably have foreseen that Alta Health would make such decision. The third element of 
proof necessary to sustain a claim for negligent misrepresentation was not met. Indeed, it was never 
even addressed in the evidence presented by Alta Health at trial. 
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Mr. Loudon testified that he "understood" that the automatic switch over was completed by 
December 25, 1991, but could not testify as to when or who specifically told him that it was 
completed. But he knew that the work was not complete. R.408-416. Thus, there was no evidence 
presented of a specific misrepresentation of a material fact. 
Another critical element totally missing from the evidence is that of reasonable reliance. To 
sustain a claim of negligent misrepresentation, Alta Health had to prove that CCI made a false 
representation, expecting Alta Health to rely and act thereon and that Alta Health reasonably did so. 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co.. 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983) (quoting Jardine 
v. Brunswick Corp.. supra.). One who complains of being injured by a false representation: 
cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but has the 
duty of exercising such degree of care to protect his own interests as 
would be exercised by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person 
under the circumstances, and if he fails to do so, is precluded from 
holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own 
neglect. 
Forsberg. et al. v. Burningham & Kimball, supra. There is no evidence in this record to support Alta 
Health's argument that it reasonably relied upon a false representation. Only the unsupported and 
misleading argument of Alta Health in its Brief is offered to support the contention of negligent 
misrepresentation. The only specific representation in evidence, from the testimony of Alta Health's 
own employee, was that the automatic switch over project was not complete before December 25, 
1991. R.654. CCI was entitled to expect that Plaintiff exercise care to protect its own interests by 
acting appropriately on the specific representation that was made. Not the reverse. Alta Health 
cannot prevail by heedlessly assuming the contrary was true without being so told. Thus, there 
could not have been any "reasonable reliance" on the part of the Alta Health. 
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POINT in 
ALTA HEALTH FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE DAMAGE 
TO ITS COMPUTER SYSTEM WAS CAUSED BY ANY ACT 
OR OMISSION ON THE PART OF CCI. 
It is well-settled that Alta Health had the burden of proof to establish the facts of causation 
of its alleged damages. Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins. Brown & Gunnell. Inc.. supra. 
Review of the record in this matter clearly demonstrates that Alta Health has failed to meet this 
burden. 
Alta Health's computer room facility was served with outside electrical power from Utah 
Power and Light. This outside electrical power directly served the air conditioning systems at the 
Alta Health facility. However, the computer equipment was served indirectly by the outside power 
which was routed through an "uninterruptible power supply" (UPS) system. The UPS was a system 
of batteries and power surge control equipment utilized to control and provide specified electrical 
power to the computer equipment. Also, in the event of a power outage from the outside power 
source, the battery powered UPS system would keep the computers operating for 30 to 45 minutes 
to prevent a "catastrophic" computer failure. R.463-465, 549, 593-594, 629-632. Thus, if the 
outside power supply was interrupted for any reason, the air conditioning system would cease 
operation but the computer equipment would continue to operate, building up heat in the computer 
room. R.466. The system was always designed to function on that basis and still does today. R. 
594. Even with the automatic switch over system now in place, if a power outage occurs, the UPS 
system continues to operate the computers but the automatic switching mechanism cannot work until 
outside power is restored to operate the air conditioning systems. R.600. 
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On December 25, 1991, Alta Health, contrary to its previous practice for many years, 
decided to leave the computer room unattended, with the employees checking in hourly. At 
approximately 3:20 p.m., Mr. Russell Loudon went to the computer room and found that the power 
had shut down and the UPS system was providing power to the computers and the lights. R.408-
409. The temperature in the computer room had reached 95-96 o. R.407. Mr. Loudon apparently 
hit the same "re-start" button that controlled the air conditioner and then called CCFs service 
number. By the time that CCFs service representative arrived [within 30-40 minutes], the air 
conditioning system was working. R.431. Mr. Loudon later testified that "the power was 
functioning when I got there." R.420. Mr. Loudon had no discussion with CCFs service 
representative on December 25, 1991, about whether there had been a power outage. Mr. Loudon 
thought that it must have been Unisys engineers who suggested that it was a power failure. He could 
not identify who. R.430. 
The sum total of the evidence is that (1) someone told Mr. Loudon that it was probably a 
power failure; and (2) Mr. Loudon testified that the UPS system was on and the power off when he 
arrived and then later testified that the power was on when he got there. There is no other testimony 
by any witness, specifically any witness present on December 25, 1991, who could aid in the 
guesswork as to whether the outside electrical power was on or off when Mr. Loudon arrived. Mr. 
Broadhead testified that the air conditioning stopped for reasons "we do not understand." R. 452. 
The state of the record is that either alternative is equally likely and was not clarified or corroborated 
by any other evidence. 
Thus, there is no direct evidence linking the failure of the air conditioning system with the 
loss claimed by Alta Health. How did the failure occur? If the outside power supply failed and was 
oflf when Mr. Loudon arrived, as he first testified, CCI cannot be found to have been at fault. If the 
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outside power did not fail, but the air conditioning system was off, what happened? There was no 
evidence whatsoever produced by Alta Health as to the cause for the air conditioning units not to 
have been operating when Mr. Loudon arrived. If the outside power supply failed but was restored 
before Mr. Loudon arrived, how long before he arrived was it restored? If the automatic switch over 
mechanism had been completed, but the outside power had failed, the air conditioning system still 
would not have been functional during such power outage. There was no evidence introduced by 
Alta Health to answer any of these questions. Without an answer, there is not sufficient evidence 
to allow a jury to speculate as to proximate cause. The causal connection between the alleged 
wrongful act of CCI and Alta Health's alleged property damage cannot be presumed. It is a matter 
of law that Alta Health was required to prove affirmatively. Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 
P.2d 240 (Utah 1985); Staheli v. Farmers' Co-Op of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982); 
Jackson v. Colston. 209 P.2d 566 (Utah 1949). 
Under the state of the record, the trial court was correct in not allowing the jury to speculate 
as to equally likely occurrences. There is no evidence that any act or failure to act on the part of CCI 
had anything to do with the Alta Health's alleged damages. 
CONCLUSION 
In any case where the plaintiff seeks recovery for damage to personal property, there are two 
fundamental burdens of proof that must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. A 
plaintiff must prove liability under certain legal theories and it must prove its damages to a 
reasonable degree of certainty. In both instances, Alta Health has failed to meet its burden of proof. 
Alta Health failed to even address, much less establish, the fundamental elements of proof 
necessary to prove damages to a reasonable degree of certainty for destruction of personal property. 
Utah law is absolutely clear in requiring proof of (1) the market value of the damaged property 
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immediately prior to its destruction; and (2) the amount of any salvage value with respect to the 
damaged property. Alta Health failed to address these necessary elements of proof of damages. 
The third element, proof of actual cost of replacement of the damaged property, also failed. 
The evidence was contradictory and speculative. The witnesses produced by Alta Health could not 
specifically testify as to the number of new generation computer components that Alta Health 
actually purchased to replace the old, unsatisfactory equipment nor the actual cost incurred. 
Likewise, Alta Health failed to establish, and in some instances even address, the necessary 
elements to prove its claim of liability against CCI. No evidence whatsoever was produced relating 
to the claims of breach of contract or breach of warranty. To the contrary, the testimony was that 
the work of CCI under the Contract in question was performed, completed, accepted and payment 
made to CCI for the work. CCI has been the air conditioning service representative for Alta Health 
since at least the early 1980's, was so in 1991 and still is today. 
Under the theory of negligent misrepresentation, Alta Health failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that CCI made a negligent misrepresentation of the fact regarding 
completion of the automatic switch over work on the air conditioning system. The only clear 
evidence from Alta Health's employees was testimony that they knew the work was not complete 
as of December 25, 1991. Thus, there was no evidence that Alta Health would have reasonably 
relied upon any misrepresentation of such fact. Finally, there was no evidence that CCI could have 
foreseen that Alta Health would leave the computer room unattended on Christmas day 1991, 
contrary to at least a ten-year history of manning the computer center 24 hours a day, 365 days a 
year. In fact, this issue was not even addressed by Alta Health. 
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As to causation, Alta Health had the burden to prove that some failure, act or omission on 
the part of CCI was the proximate cause of its alleged damages. The evidence presented by Alta 
Health presented the trial court and the jury with nothing but possible alternatives to what may have 
happened. There was no evidence of what caused the air conditioning system to cease operation on 
December 25, 1991. If there was a power outage, there was no evidence of when or how long it 
lasted. 
The sum total of Alta Health's evidence on any necessary issue was "speculative." 
Consequently, the trial court was correct in refusing to allow the jury to speculate with a verdict. 
The directed verdict against Alta Health was correct and should be affirmed by this Court. 
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